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The jury returned a special verdict under comparative negligence,
attributing ten percent (10%) of the negligence to the defendant, and ninety percent (90%) of the negligence to the plaintiffs. (R.22-23)• Judgment on the special verdict was entered
by the court on the 12th day of April, 1976, in favor of the
defendant and against the plaintiffs, no cause of action.(R. 1721).

Plaintiffs subsequently made a motion for a new trial

alleging that the evidence was insufficient to justify the
findings in the Special Verdict, the court erred as a matter
of law in submitting a jury instruction and interrogatory on
assumption of risk, the court erred in failing to give certain
instructions requested by the plaintiffs and erred in giving
the instructions that it gave, the court erred in refusing
to admit certain regulations of the Public Service Commission
as evidence of the duty of the defendant, the court erred in
granting summary judgment to the defendants and striking
plaintiffs Fourth Cause of Action, and the court erred in
dismissing the First, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh causes of action
of plaintiffs complaint. (R. 15-16).
tiff

The court denied Plain-

motion for a new trial. (R. 11-14).

Plaintiffs appeal

from the decision of the Trial Court,
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants submit that the trial court erred as a matter
of law and seek a remand of the case for a new trial,
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts are for information purposes only,
inasmuch as the appellants contend that the Court erred as a
matter ofDigitized
law.by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Mr. Al. G. Rigtrup and his three sons-in-law, Mark Petersen,
Bud Shepherd and Leon Zeeman, operate several poultry related
businesses in the Lake Shore, Utah area.

(Lake Shore, Utah is

approximately four miles west of Spanish Fork, Utah.)
In the fall of 1972, the plaintiffs commenced an expansion
program which was designated as the Lake Shore Egg Ranch and
which was ultimately to include several coops and a processing
plant.

Anticipating the need for proper electricity, the appel-

lants arranged with the respondent for the supply of electricity
to the newly constructed coops.

A constant and sufficient supply

of electricity is needed since large numbers of chickens in close
proximity generate great amounts of heat which require large fans
to cool and circulate air thereby maintaining a controlled environment.
Construction of the first coop began in the fall of 1972
and was completed in December of 1972.

The coop housed approx-

imately 30,000 laying hens.
To supply electricity for construction, the respondent extended an existing 12 0 volt single-phase power line to the site.
The line was connected to plaintiffs' coops through a weatherhead,
standpipe, meter base and switch box (referred to as a "service"
in the electrical industry) furnished by the plaintiffs.
In the spring of 1973, appellants commenced construction of
a second coop at the same site.

On April 1, 1973, after an

unusually heavy snow storm, the roof of the first coop collapsed,
killing several thousand chickens and effectively terminating the
operation.

Appellants continued to build the second coop, sal-

vaging material from the first and eventually completed the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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construction of the first coop which was completed in July
Of 1973.

Laying chickens were then placed in both coops with

total number being approximately 60,000.
On July 1, 1973, there occurred some difficulty with the
breaker box which was evidently due to the characteristic of
aluminum wire to flow under pressure which loosened the wire

I
and caused a short.

Respondent arrived at the scene after a

call and repaired the damage.
Because of the added power draw due to the increase in
electrically operated equipment, the respondent changed a
10 KVA transformer near the coop site to a 15 KVA and eventually
to a 25 KVA transformer.

Even with the 25 KVA transformer, the

^

appellants often were drawing the maximum power load available.
On August 9, 1973, at approximately 6:00 p.m., a power
outage occurred at the coop site, which caused the suffocation
of approximately 4 0,000 laying hens.

^

The outage was apparently

caused by a burn out in the wire between the transformer and
weather head on the stand pipe or actually in the stand pipe

*

itself.
The respondent and its agents apparently knew that the
wire in the stand pipe and meter base was inadequate and so

g

advised an electrician employed by the appellants and possibly
one of the appellants themselves.
Appellants had installed a stand-by electrical generator

f

and engageing apparatus which was not connected at the time of
the outage.
The plaintiffs' contention was that the defendant had represented to the plaintiffs that 120-240 three phase power would
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
be furnished to the
coops by a certain date and that the elec-

(

tricity was not furnished and that the plaintiffs had to then
rely upon the makeshift temporary service in-lieu of connecting the new service and auxiliary generating equipment.

The

defendants contention was that the plaintiffs knew that the
temporary service was inadequate and that it made no promises
to the plaintiffs to furnish any power by any certain date.
As previously stated, the issues were tried to a jury on
April 5-7, 1976, with several of the plaintiffs1 causes of
action being dismissed, leaving only the issues of negligence
to be tried.
During the course of the trial the plaintiffs attempted
to introduce into evidence certain Rules and Regulations of the
Public Service Commission of the State of Utah, but the evidence
was excluded upon the sustaining of the defendant's objection.
(R. 127-133).
Another issue causing much dispute during the trial was
the applicability of the doctrine of Assumption of Risk.

At

the close of plaintiffs1 case, the defendant moved the court
for a dismissal on assumption of risk, and the plaintiffs
responded, arguing that it would be error to instruct on
assumption of risk under Utah's comparative negligence law.
(R. 113-127).
It is appellants' position that the trial court erred as
a matter of law in instructing on assumption of risk in a comparative negligence case, erred in failing to admit the Rules
and Regulations of the Public Service Commission and erred in
failing to grant plaintiffs1 motion for a new trial.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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POINT I
THE DEFENSE OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK IS INVALID AND NOT
AVAILABLE TO THE RESPONDENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
The advent of comparative negligence, either by statute
or by judicial decision, has caused great confusion in the
minds of commentators and courts as to the applicability of
doctrines which were formally associated with contributory
negligence.

One of those doctrines is assumption of risk.

The Utah Legislature, in adopting the comparative negligence
statute, apparently considered the impact that comparative
negligence would have upon assumption of risk and specifically
spoke to that issue in the statute;
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery
in an action by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence or gross
negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or property, if such negligence was not as
great as the negligence or gross negligence of the
person against whom recovery is sought, but any
damages allowed shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to
the person recovering. As used in this act, "contributory negligence" includes "assumption of the
risk." Utah Code Ann., 1953, Section 78-27-37(1973).
Utah has no clear judicial precedent abolishing assumption
of risk as a separate defense,

1

nor has this Court inter-

preted the "assumption of the risk" aspect of the comparative
negligence law, and consequently, some confusion has arisen.
x

The following states have judicially abolished the
affirmative defense of assumption of risk: California,
Li vs. Yellow Cab Company of California, 119 Cal.Rptr, 858,
532 P.2d 1226(1975); Hawaii, Bulatao vs. Kauai Motors, Ltd.,
49 Haw. 1,406 P.2d 887 (1965); Idaho, Fawcett vs. Irby, 92
Idaho 48, 436 P.2d 714 (1968); New Hampshire, Bolduc vs.
Grain, 104 N.H. 163, 181 A.2d 641 (1962); New Jersey,
Meistrich vs. Caseno Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 155
A.2d 90 (1959); Wyoming, Ford Motor Company vs. Arquello, 382
P.2d 886 (Wyo.1963) . Other courts expressing disfavor with the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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At the close of the presentation of evidence in the
present'case, the defendant made a motion to dismiss the case
on the grounds that as a matter of law the plaintiffs had
assumed the risk of the power outage.

(R. 113-127).

The

trial judge expressed his confusion on the assumption of risk
and questioned whether the doctrine was a separate doctrine or
had merged into the comparative negligence statute. (R. 115).
After extensive argument on both sides, the court ruled that
it was going to instruct the jury on assumption of risk.

The

plaintiff again objected on the ground that assumption of risk
does not apply in a comparative negligence case. (R. 119).
The court eventually decided to instruct upon assumption
of risk and did so.

Instructions numbered 12, 13, and 14

(R. 57, 58, 59) specifically apply to assumption of risk.
addition, Interrogatory

In

number 6 of the special verdict re-

quired the jury to find whether plaintiffs had assumed the risk
of the power outage.

(R.23, 50). It is plaintiffs position

that any instruction on assumption of risk, in light of the
comparative negligence statute, is error as a matter of law
inasmuch as the statute specifically includes assumption of
risk in comparative negligence.

doctrine of assumption of risk are Hale vs. O'Neill, 492 P.2d
101 (Alaska 1971); Frelick vs. Homeopathic Hospital Ass, of
Delaware, 51 Del 568, 150 A2d 17 (1959); Parker vs. Redden, 421
SW2d 586 (KY.App. 1967); Baltimore County vs. State, 323 Md.
350, 193 A2d 30 (1963); Feigner vs. Anderson, 375 Mich. 23,
133 N.W.2d 136 (1965); Ritter vs. Beals, 225 Ore. 504, 358
P.2d 1080 (1961); Siragusa vs. Swedish Hospital, 60 Wash.2d 310,
373 P.2d 767 (196T3T Those states abolishing assumption of
risk as a separate defense under comparative negligence are
Connecticut, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Utah.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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4
To properly determine whether assumption of risk should
survive as a defense under comparative negligence, the nature

M

of assumption of risk must first be analyzed.
An ititial problem is that the term "assumption of risk"
has been used by scholars and courts to describe a variety of
legal concepts.

|

In addition, various doctrines such as "volenti

non fit injuria11 and "no duty" have become intermeshed with
assumption of risk.

|

The defense of assumption of risk has basically taken two
forms, express assumption of risk and implied assumption of risk.
Express assumption of risk is where a party expressly

|

agrees in advance to waive any claim for liability for the consequences of conduct that the law might other wise view as
negligent.

Implied assumption of risk is where the plaintiff

4

voluntarily decides to take his chances when he knows that
there may be some possible negligent conduct on the part of
the defendant.

A third category of assumption of risk is.some-

4

times recognized where the plaintiff is aware of the negligent
act already done by the defendant and nevertheless proceeds
voluntarily to encounter it.

Prosser, Law of Torts, 4th

4

Edition, p. 440, explains the three theories as follows:
In its simplest and primary sense, assumption of risk means that the plaintiff, in advance, has given his consent to relieve the defendarit of an obligation of conduct toward
him, and to take his chances of injury from
a known risk arising from what the defendant
is to do or leave undone. The situation is
then the same as where the plaintiff consents
to the infliction of what would otherwise be
an intentional tort, except that the consent
is to run the risk of unintended injury, to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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4

'

take a chance, rather than a matter of the
greater certainty of intended harm. The result .
is that the defendant is relieved of all legal
duty to the plaintiff; and being under no duty
he cannot be charged with negligence.
A second, and closely related situation,
is where the plaintiff voluntarily enters into
some relation with the defendant, with knowledge that the defendant will not protect him
against risk. He may then be regarded as
tacitly or impliedly consenting to negligence,
and agreeing to take his own chances. Thus
he may accept employment, knowing that he is
expected to work with a dangerous horse; or a
ride in a car with knowledge that the brakes
are defective and the driver incompetent; or
he may enter a baseball park, sit in an unscreened seat, and so consent that the players
may proceed with the game without taking any
precautions to protect him from being hit by
the ball. Again the legal result is that the
defendant is simply relieved of the duty which
would otherwise exist.
In the third type of situation the plaintiff,
aware of a risk already created by the negligence of the defendant, proceeds voluntarily
to encounter it-as where he has been supplied
with a chattel which he knows to be unsafe, and
proceeds to use it after he has discovered the
danger. If this is a voluntary choice, it may
be found that he has accepted the situation, and
consented to relieve the defendant of his duty.
For an additional discussion of the various types of
assumption of risk see Schwartz, Comparative Negligence,
p. 153, Chapter 9.
In discussing the doctrine of assumption of risk, this
Court has apparently made a distinction between contractual
assumption of risk and implied, or voluntary assumption of
risk.
Calhan y. Wood, 24 Utah2d 8, 465 P.2d 169 (1970);
Foster v. Steed, 23 Utah2d 148, 459 P,2d 1021 (1969); Hindmarsh
v. O. P. Skaggs Foodliner, 21 Utah2d 413, 446 P.2d 410 (1968);
Ferguson v. Jongsma, 10 Utah2d 179, 350 P.2d 404 (1960); Johnson
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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i

v. Maynard, 9 Utah2d 268, 342 P.2d 884 (1959); Clay v,
Dunford, 121 Utah 177, 239 P.2d 1075 (1952); Taylor v.
Bamberger Electric Co,, 62 Utah 552, 220 P. 695 (1923);
Kuchenmeister v. Los Angeles & S. L. R. Co., 52 Utah 116,
172 P. 725 (1918) .
This Court has, however, indicated on several occasions
that assumption of risk can merge into contributory negligence.
Johnson v. Maynard, supra.
The doctrine of assumption of risk is but a specialized
aspect of the defense of contributory negligence.

Heindmarsh

vs. Skaggs Foodliner, supra.
Professor Schwartz in his treatise, Comparative Negligence,
supra, discusses the Utah comparative negligence statute and
points to the confusion that exists.
The key section of the Utah Statute is almost
identical with that of Idaho except that there is
added to the Utah Statute a sentence defining "contributory negligence" to include assumption of the
risk. There had been some question in Utah as to
whether implied assumption of risk was a part of
contributory negligence or was a separate defense.
The definition was apparently added to make it clearer that applied assumption of risk is subject to
comparison under the statute. It is questionable whether
expressed assumption of risk is subject to comparison
or remains as a separate and complete defense.
Heft and Heft, Comparative Negligence Manual (1971),
1976 Cumulative Supplement, page 9, states:
Under Utah law, assumption of risk, like any
other form of contributory negligence, is aportioned
under Utah's comparative negligence statute. Utah
Code Annotated, Section 78-27-37.
It is obvious that the commentators agree that under
Utah law, implied or ordinary assumption of risk is to be
considered as contributory negligence on the part of the
plaintiff and is to be weighed in the verdict on comparative
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

negligence.

Plaintiff submits that the Utah statute, if

carefully read, is also clear on that point.

Consequently, in

the case in which there is no evidence of an express contract
to assume a risk, there is no need to instruct an assumption
of risk as it is included in the process of comparing the
negligence of the parties.

Any instruction on assumption of

risk would be duplicitous.

In fact,it was upon that very

basis that the plaintiffs objected to the instructions on
assumption of risk given by the court:
My further objection to the assumption of
risk instruction is that it weights, it adds undue
balance to the question of contributory negligence
and adds an additional negligence factor to the
question of comparative negligence that would otherwise be in a comparative negligence case. Furthermore, that the question of assumption of risk is
incompatable with a comparative negligence issue
and that the Court should never give instructions
concerning comparative negligence and assumption of
risk in the same group of instructions. (R. 135-136). .
Respondent has argued and undoubtedly will argue that even if
it was error for the trial court to give the instructions on
assumption of risk, that such error was not prejudicial.
In countering plaintiffs1 argument during the hearing
on the motion for a new trial, the defendant argued that the
giving of instructions on assumption of risk could not have
been error because the question on assumption of risk on the
verdict form came only after the jury had answered the questions on negligence. (R. 144-145).

Plaintiff however submits

that it was error since instruction no. 4, given by the Court,
was a pre-statement of the special verdict form. The jury
encountered the question on assumption of risk before it ever
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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began to answer the special verdict. (R. 49-50).

Also,

before the jury was required to answer the special verdict
on assumption of risk, it undoubtedly had considered instructions No. 12, 13, and 14 on assumption of risk given
by the Court.

In addition, the special verdict form does

not require the jury to answer the questions on negligence
before answering the question on assumption of risk.

The

jury may have answered questions No. 6 first and then gone
back and answered the other questions.
Appellants submit that it was error in law to instruct
the jury on the issue of assumption of risk, and that such
instruction and the question on the special verdict form on
assumption of risk prejudiced the appellants and therefore
the cause should be remanded for a new trial governed by the
comparative negligence statute.

Appellants are entitled to

have a jury consider their case which is properly instructed
under the recently adopted comparative law of Utah.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page 12

POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ADMIT EXHIBIT 33 AND
IN REFUSING TO GIVE PLAINTIFFS1 REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS.
During the course of trial the plaintiffs requested the
Court to admit a copy of certain rules and regulations of the
Public Service Commission governing an electric utility
company. (Exhibit 33). The Court heard argument on the admissibility but eventually rejected the exhibit. (R. 127-134).
At the close of trial the plaintiffs requested the
Court to instruct the jury on the applicable rules of the
Public Service Commission. (R. 172-174).

The Court refused

to give the instructions to the jury and specifically refused the instruction incorporating Public Utility Regulation
A67-05-31:ll.

(R. ..174).

Appellants contend the Court

erred in refusing to admit Exhibit 33 (Public Utilities
Regulations) and in refusing to give plaintiffs' requested
instructions.
In 1971, the Legislature of the State of Utah adopted
legislation which made it clear that Utah would require
certain minimum standards for electrical installations.

The

legislation was introduced as House Bill number 203 and
when finally passed, carried the following caption:
"MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR ELECTRICAL INSTALLATIONS.
An Act Relating to Electrical Installations and Equipment; Providing for the Creation of Minimum Standards for Installations of Electrical Equipment Within the State of Utah; and Providing Certain Exemptions
from the Standards Established." (Laws of Utah, 1971,
Chapter 167)
When the act was finally codified, it was put under the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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section entitled "Electricians" and became Utah Code
Annotated, §58-36-20 through 23.
The relevent portions of §58-36-21 state as follows:
"58-36-21 Safety requirements and applicable
standards for installations of electrical
equipment.—(1) All installations of electrical
equipment shall be reasonable safe to persons
and property and in conformity with the
applicable statutes of the State of Utah, and
all applicable ordinances, orders, rules and
regulations of any political subdivisions
of the State of Utah which are not in conflict
with this act.
As used in this act, 'reasonably safe to
persons and property1 as applied to electrical
installations and electrical equipment means
safe to use in the service for which the
installations or equipment is intended without
unnecessary hazard to life, limb or property*
(2)
Conformity of installations of electrical
equipment with the applicable regulations set forth
in the 1968 edition of the National Electrical Code,
the National Electrical Safety Code, or other
safety codes which have been approved by the
United States of America Standards Institute shall
be prima facia evidence that such installations are
reasonably safe to persons and property." (emphasis
added.)
The foregoing statute was apparently an outgrowth
of regulations which had existed in the State of Utah for
several years.

In 194 0 the Public Service Commission for

the State of Utah adopted rules and regulations pertaining
to electrical installations and equipment used thereon.
Rule 11 of those rules and regulations provides in part
as follows:
II. General Requirements —
a. Unless otherwise directed by the Comission,
the requirements contained in the latest edition of
the National Electrical Safety Code, issued by the
National Bureau of Standards, shall be the minimum
requirement relative to: (1) the installation and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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maintenance of electrical supply stations; (2)
the installation and maintenance of overhead and
underground electrical supply and communication
lines; (3) the installation and maintenance of
electric utilization equipment; and (4) rules to
be observed in the operation of electrical equipment and lines. Existing ungrounded low-potential
circuits shall be grounded in conformity with the
requirements of the National Electrical Safety Code
by January 1, 1940.
* * *

f. No utility shall furnish electric service
to any applicant until satisfied that the wiring
and utilization equipment to be served have been
inspected and passed by the controlling public
inspection and authority. Should an electric utility
either before or after connecting a customer discover defective electric wiring or defective equipment in service, or discover electric wiring or equipment service which causes undue interference with the
service rendered other customers, it shall immediately
report the same to the Commission and should it be
notified in writing by this Commission or by city or
county authorities that consumers1 wiring or electrical
is defective, or causes undue interference with the
service rendered other customers, it shall immediately
discontinue electrical service for use through such
wires or in such equipment, unless special permission
is otherwise given by this Commission to continue such
service.
g. Each electric utility shall, upon request,
give its customers such information and assistance as is
reasonable, in order that its customers may secure safe
and efficient service, and upon request it shall rend e r every reasonable assistance in securing appliances
properly adapted and adjusted to the service furnished.
Public Utility Regulation A67-05-31:11.
Appellants submit that the foregoing rules and regulations evidence a standard of care that a Public Utility
Company is required to exercise.

Part of that standard of

care is not to furnish electrical power to a customer's
facilities when it knows that those facilities are inadequate*
u the present case there is no dispute that the respondent
knew that the "service" of the appellants was insufficient
Page 15
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4
to carry the added burden placed upon it by the changing
of the transformers and was insufficient to allow the
appellants to continue to draw the amounts of power that
they were using through the system without a failure*
Appellants submit, therefore, that the foregoing rules and

4
regulations of the Public Service Commission evidence that
degree of care required by the respondent.
The modern trend of the law is to allow such safety
4

codes or standards or rules and regulations into evidence on
the issue of negligence. 58 ALR3d 148, Annotation: Admissibility in Evidence, On Issue of Negligence, of Codes
4

or Standards of Safety Issued or Sponsored by Govermental
Body or by Voluntary Association.

Utah appears to be among

those jurisdictions allowing the use of such safety standards*

I
In Wheeler v. Jones, 19 Utah2d 392, 431 P2d 985 (1967), this
Court allowed safety standards on sliding glass doors to be
admitted, stating:

I
"It will be noted that the Court did not
say that it was the standard of the community—
rather, he seemed to imply that it was one of the
standards of the community in determining whether
or not the defendants were negligent.
We think the testimony was proper to show
the knowledge of the danger involved and how
extensive that information had become."
In the present case the Public Service Commission Rules
and Regulations should have been admitted to allow the jury
to consider them as evidence of the standard of care in
light of knowledge by the respondent that the system was
inadequate.

It was, therefore, error by the trial court to
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refuse to so instruct the jury and to reject Exhibit 33.
Since the jury was not instructed as t

the applicable

standard of care, appellants submit that the proper remedy
is to remand the case for a new trial.
CONCLUSION
Instructing the jury on assumption of risk by the trial
court unfairly prejudiced the appellants and weighted the
verdict in favor of the defendant and the failure of the
Court to properly instruct the jury on the standard of care
required by the Public Service Commission Rules and Regulations precluded the jury from fairly deciding the negligence
of the parties.

For these reasons, the Court also erred in

denying appellants1 motion for a new trial.
Appellants respectfully request the Court to remand the
case for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,

Jackson Howard, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Appellants
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I, Marianne Peterson, certify that I mailed a copy
of the foregoing Brief to Reed L. Martineau, Attorney for
Defendant-Respondent, 701 Continental Bank Building, Salt
Lake City, Utah

84101 and to Dave McMullin r .Jo-Counsel

for Defendant-Respondent, 20 East Utah Avenue, Payson, Utah
84651, this

/ f^

day of October, 1976.
r

lYiaJLLMWU ,

Secretary
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